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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to advance theoretical understanding of the 
important role of both power and negotiation during online deception.  By so 
doing, the paper provides insight into the relationship between perpetrator and 
victim in Internet fraud. The growing prevalence of Internet Fraud continues to 
be a burden to both society and individuals. In an attempt to better understand 
Internet fraud and online deception, this article attempts to build an interactive 
model, based upon the dimensions of power and negotiation from the 
management and psychology literature. Using the model presented, the article 
examines the effects of the Internet on the communication process that takes 
place between perpetrator and victim. Finally, the article discusses some of the 
major tactics employed to appeal to each power type in predominant fraud 
forms, as well exploring future types of fraud.  
Keywords: Internet, fraud, cybercrime, power, negotiation, deception 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last several decades, the subject of fraud has received substantial 
attention in nearly all fields of management.  Frauds such as Enron, 
WorldCom, Tyco, and Adelphia have resulted in a mistrust of the United States 
accounting standards and profession, causing accounting rule makers and 
government regulators to reevaluate and reestablish basic accounting 
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procedures (Apostolon and Crumbley, 2005).  Large frauds around the world 
such as Parmalat, Harris Scarfe, HIH, Royal Ahold and SK Global show that 
these disasters are not just occurring in the United States, but are prevalent 
throughout the world.  One conservative estimate suggests that organizations in 
the United States lose more than six percent of their total revenue as a result of 
various types of fraud (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2004).  
As described above, fraud has a large impact on society. However, in the last 
few years, as a result of technology and the explosive growth of the Internet 
and e-commerce, Internet fraud has become a major concern for consumers, 
merchants, and governments (Balsmeier et. al., 2004, National White Collar 
Crime Center et al. 2004). Gartner estimates that growth in electronic 
commerce and online financial services during the next three years alone will 
be one to three percentage points lower than if people had improved online 
protection. In the 12 months prior to May 2005, within the United States alone, 
2.4 million people lost $929 million to Internet fraud (Richmond, 2005). Many 
of these on-line consumer frauds are aimed at the uneducated, unaware, 
elderly, or immigrants, preying upon the most weak and susceptible of society 
(Locovich, 2005; Marlowe and Atiles, 2005). In the past, committing fraud was 
more difficult and resulted in paper trails and other physical evidence.   
However, today a perpetrator can steal, conceal, and transfer assets with only 
the click of a mouse.   
Almost daily, new frauds and scams arise using the Internet and other 
technological advances as the tools to perpetrate the crimes. Individuals 
throughout the world are approached with fraudulent business deals, false 
money transfers, and other misleading exchanges in chat rooms, by email, on 
Internet pop-ups, or during Internet auctions.  It has been suggested that 3 main 
areas of fraud exist on the Internet: securities law violations, crime and fraud in 
electronic commerce, and deceitful acts by Internet companies or individuals 
(Baker, 2002). 
Internet fraud perpetrators exert considerable effort in order to influence and 
gain power over their faceless victims.  An individual in a Internet chat room 
who claims to have private information about a public company, citizens of 
Nigeria who claim to have access to substantial funds, or illegitimate 
companies who con consumers into providing personal financial information 
are all examples of perpetrators’ attempts to gain power over unwary victims.  
Given the enormous costs of fraud and the growing prevalence of Internet 
fraud, the goal of this research is to advance theoretical understanding of the 
power that perpetrators use when influencing victims via the Internet.  
Specifically, the research proposes an interactive model combining the 
dimensions of power and negotiation from the management and psychological 
literature and applying it to the fraud process. The article then goes on to 
explain the role of the Internet and other technological advances on fraud using 
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this model.  
It has been suggested that there are two primary methods used to get something 
from others illegally: physical force and deception (Albrecht, et. al., 2006). 
Fraud is defined as: 
A generic term, and embraces all the multifarious means which human 
ingenuity can devise, which are resorted to by one individual, to get an 
advantage over another by false representation.  No definite and invariable 
rule can be laid down as a general proposition in defining fraud, as it 
includes surprise, trickery, cunning and unfair ways by which another is 
cheated.  The only boundaries defining it are those, which limit human 
knavery (Webster’s New World Dictionary, 1964). 
2. EXISTING MODELS OF FRAUD 
Classic fraud theory explains the motivations for fraud as a triangle of 
perceived opportunity, perceived pressure, and rationalization, as shown 
below: 
 
Figure 1. Fraud Triangle  
The initial contributor to this model was Edwin Sutherland in his 1949 book, 
White Collar Crime, for which he is credited with coining the term.  According 
to Sutherland, white-collar crime is different from street crime in many ways.  
It is committed by those of high status and power, it often involves violation by 
a trusted person in professions such as medicine, law, accounting, banking and 
business, and it is usually committed by individuals who do not see themselves 
as criminals.  White-collar crime is believed to occur more frequently in large, 
rather than small businesses, and the general assumption is that prosecutors and 
judges are more lenient on white-collar criminals than on street-level criminals.   
One of Sutherland’s most famous students was Donald Cressey who wrote the 
book, Other People’s Money (1953).  In the studies on which his book is based, 
he conducted interviews averaging 15 hours in length with 133 prison inmates 
who had been convicted of embezzlement.  This book, published in 1953, is an 
investigation of the social psychology of the violation of trust, a subject that 
Cressey was concerned with throughout his career.  By a procedure known as 
analytic induction, he developed a general statement about embezzlement 
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behavior.  Although not claiming predictive power for the theory, he 
established three conditions, all of which must be present for the crime to take 
place.  The persons must have: (1) financial problems defined as non-sharable, 
(2) an opportunity to violate trust, (3) rationalization of the act.  
Albrecht et al. (1979, 1981) introduced Sutherland’s and Cressey’s work into 
the business literature. They concluded that Cressey’s three factors were on 
target and labeled them as the fraud triangle. They further concluded that the 
three factors worked together interactively so that if more of one factor were 
present, less of the other factors needed to exist for fraud to occur. One of the 
main limitations of this model is that it only describes the factors that influence 
the perpetrator, and does not discuss the relationship between perpetrator and 
victim. Nor is the fraud triangle specific to online deception. Rather, it is an all-
encompassing model to explain the variables involved when someone is 
involved in any type of fraud.   
Unfortunately, research investigating online deception is limited (Nikitkov and 
Stone, 2006). Some of the most common online deception tactics are based on 
the Bowyer (1982) and Bell & Whaley (1982, 1991) taxonomy of cheating and 
deception. Johnson et al (2001), as well as Grazioli and Jarvenpaa (2000, 
2003a, 2003b) have applied the taxonomy to classify the various techniques 
employed in Internet deception. In addition, recent research into online 
deception has addressed specific types of fraud such as auction fraud (Chua 
and Wareham 2004), spoofing (Dinev, 2006), and spamming (Hann et al, 
2006). However, much of this recent research lacks any explicit theoretical 
explanation, but describes the phenomenon on a surface level. As an exception, 
Pavlou and Gefen (2005) examine how online fraud, combined with many 
other factors such as trust, institutional structures, trust in community of 
sellers, and past buying experience can lead to psychological contract 
violations between the buyer and seller and thereby influence purchasing 
behavior. Finally, some of the literature from the economics field has 
investigated incentives for fraudulent behavior as well as possible changes to 
legal structures that would change these incentives (Snyder 2000, Bywell and 
Oppenheim 2001).   
While prior literature has addressed various aspects of online fraud such as 
common deception techniques, we only have a limited theoretical 
understanding of the relationship between perpetrator and victim in an online 
environment. The Internet presents a unique set of circumstances for 
consumers in that it does not provide the normal social or spatial cues that they 
typically use to estimate the risk of fraud. Moreover, online fraud is a covert 
crime, and society often places less emphasis on the prosecution of these 
nonviolent crimes. In addition, Internet frauds tend to be of moderate nominal 
amounts to minimize scrutiny, and often cross legal jurisdictions, thereby 
reducing the motivation or ability of authorities to prosecute them (Chua and 
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Wareham, 2004). As a result of the nature of this relatively novel medium, we 
argue for the need for a specific theory that addresses the relationships between 
the potential perpetrator and the potential victims of fraud as it is facilitated 
through the Internet.  
Our paper proceeds by proposing an interactive model, based on French and 
Raven’s framework on power, to explain the relationship that takes place 
between perpetrator and victim.  Online deception is different from other types 
of fraud in that it is necessary for the victim to submit to the will of the 
perpetrator in order for a perpetrator to be successful.  In this sense, a 
negotiation must take place.  In the following section we discuss negotiation, 
its definition, and its role in the process of online deception. 
3. DEFINITION OF NEGOTIATION 
Negotiation has been defined as “an interpersonal decision-making process by 
which two or more people agree how to allocate scarce resources” (Thompson, 
2000).  Both researchers and practitioners have spent much time and resources 
to better understand the negotiation process (Lewicki, et. al., 1999) and its’ 
various influences, including the negotiators’ bargaining history and its’ effects 
on future negotiation performance (O’Conner et. al., 2005).  When a fraud 
takes place, the fraudulent transaction can be described as a negotiation. In the 
fraud setting, the perpetrator and victim make an interpersonal decision to 
allocate resources, with the victim transferring resources to the perpetrator 
(often for some promised return or false representation).  When the fraud takes 
place, from both the perpetrators and the victims’ perspectives, a successful 
negotiation has taken place.  It usually isn’t until some time later that the 
victim learns that he or she has been deceived into a fraudulent negotiation. 
Proposition 1: When a fraud takes place, the victim believes he or she has 
participated in a successful negotiation.  
4. DEFINITION OF POWER 
Since the process of negotiation and its effect on individuals and transactions 
was first introduced into the psychology literature, one of the fundamental 
variables that has been studied has been that of power (Marwell et al., 1969). 
Power is a critical factor and fundamental element for success in the 
negotiation process (Kim et. al., 2005). Weber (1947) introduced power as the 
probability that a person can carry out his or her own will despite resistance. 
When a fraud takes place, the perpetrator has the desire to carry out his or her 
will – taking advantage of the victim through deceit – regardless of resistance. 
Most of the power literature since Weber’s time has supported his basic 
definition (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980).  In order to understand power, French 
and Raven (1959) introduced a framework that has, arguably, become the most 
commonly referenced appraisal with regards to power in the management 
literature (Kim et. al, 2005).   
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Proposition 2: Understanding the relationship between power and 
negotiation in the fraud process can help researchers and practitioners 
understand, research, and evaluate fraudulent transactions more fully.  
French and Raven (1959) propose that power is comprised of five separate 
variables, each stemming from the different aspects of the relationship between 
the actor and the actor’s target of influence. It has been said that these five 
power bases have stood the test of time (Dapiran and Hogarth-Scott, 2003). 
Specifically, French and Raven suggest that A’s power over B is determined by 
(1) A’s ability to provide benefits to B (reward power), (2) A’s ability to 
punish B if B does not comply with A’s wishes (coercive power), (3) A’s 
possession of special knowledge or expertise (expert power), (4) A’s legitimate 
right to prescribe behavior for B (legitimate power), and (5) the extent to which 
B identifies with A (referent power).  Using these five definitions it is possible 
to divide power into various categories and create five subtypes of power.  
Figure 2 presents the five types of power. 
 
Figure 2: Five Types of Power 
This model explains the types of power that are used in the relationship 
between the actor and the actor’s target of influence. However, recent research 
on these types of power in the negotiation process has shown that it is 
perceived power, rather than actual power, that affects the outcome of any 
given negotiation (Wolfe and McGinn, 2005). Even if A doesn’t actually have 
power over B, if B perceives A to have power, then it is as if A truly has power 
in the negotiation process. Hence these five types of power can be classified as 
perceived reward power, perceived coercive power, perceived expert power, 
perceived legitimate power, and perceived referent power.  In this paper, we 
introduce the idea that, applied to fraud, perceived power is used as a means to 
influence the negotiation between the perpetrator and the victim. As can be 
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seen above, the perpetrator must deceive the victim into negotiating using one 
of the five types of perceived power.  
Proposition 3: To fully comprehend the role of power in fraudulent 
transactions, it is necessary to interpret the five different types of power as 
perceived power.  
Perceived reward power is the ability of the perpetrator to convince the victim 
that he or she will provide the desired benefits through a negotiation.  The 
promise of a monetary reward for participation in a Nigerian money scam, the 
promise of validation of personal information in a phishing operation, or the 
promise of high-paying jobs as a bogus mystery shopper are all examples of 
reward power.   
Perceived coercive power is the ability of the perpetrator to make the victim 
perceive potential punishment if he or she doesn’t participate in the 
negotiation. This potential punishment is usually based on fear (Politis, 2005). 
If the victim perceives that the perpetrator has the ability to punish him or her 
in any way the perpetrator begins to exercise a form of coercive power over 
that individual. Perceived coercive power is a tool often used by CEOs, CFOs, 
and other executives when a financial statement fraud takes place.  Executives 
will often use coercive power to influence employees and others to participate 
in the fraud.  These individuals fear they may lose their jobs, or be 
discriminated if they do not participate. Perpetrators can use coercive power, 
via the Internet, in at least four ways (1) by gaining personal information about 
the victim through spoofing, sniffing, or data theft, (2) through processes such 
as click through frauds or other physical fraudulent means, (3) deceiving the 
victim to believe that the perpetrator can do physical harm to them, and (4) 
persuading the victim that if they do not act now the opportunity will be lost.    
Perceived expert power is the ability of the perpetrator to use influence through 
means of expertise or knowledge. Examples of frauds that involve perceived 
expert power include perpetrators who claim to have access to non-public or 
other sensitive information or perpetrators who claim to have a special 
knowledge of a given activity. Deceiving a victim into believing that a 
perpetrator has expert knowledge or expertise is using expert power to 
influence a victim. In one of the most well known frauds of all time, Charles 
Ponzi conned victims into believing that he had expert knowledge in foreign 
postal coupons.  Charles Ponzi claimed that he could make significant profit 
for investors by purchasing stamps in Spain for about 1 cent (N.Y. Times, 
1920) and selling them in America for six cents. Using this “expert 
knowledge” he deceived individuals out of millions of dollars and gave birth to 
the popular phrase “Ponzi Scheme.”  
Perceived legitimate power is the ability of a perpetrator to convince victims 
that he or she has some form of real power over them.  Often, this type of fraud 
involves individuals claiming to represent the individual’s church, community, 
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or organization.  The perpetrator assumes some form of authoritative role and 
convinces the victim that such authority is legitimate. An example of this type 
of fraud is the “Greater Ministries” fraud.  Individuals were told to invest 
money into programs such as the “Double Your Money” program and the 
“Faith Promises Program.”  Members of the congregation were promised that 
they would double their money in just 17 months. The fraud involved over 
18,000 individuals who lost more than $448 million.  In 2001, five leaders of 
the Greater Ministries International Church were convicted in United States 
federal court on a total of 72 counts of conspiracy, wire and mail fraud, and 
money laundering (Gibelman and Gelman, 2003).  
Perceived reference power is the ability of the perpetrator to relate to the target 
of influence. Perpetrators will build relationships of confidence with a victim 
via an Internet chat room or other media. Perpetrators often use perceived 
reference power to gain confidence from victims and deceive them into fraud.  
Perceived reference power is possible because perpetrators characteristics, 
unlike other criminals, are very similar to the general population’s 
characteristics (Romney, 1980). When fraud does occur, one of the most 
common reactions by those around the fraud is denial.  Victims can’t believe 
that he or she, a trusted friend, would deceive them and behave dishonestly 
(Albrecht, 2006). 
5. DECEPTION 
There are many cases where deception has been used in the negotiation process 
(Schweitzer, 1997). Not only is deception a part of many negotiations, but it 
has also been suggested that deception increases as the incentives for 
performance increase (Tenbrunsal, 1998). Deceitful negotiation has been used 
to fraudulently manipulate individuals throughout history.  In the negotiation 
process it is deception that allows the perpetrator to falsely exercise power over 
the victim. The theory of deception identifies seven operational tactics 
employed to deceive a victim (Grazioli and Jarvenpaa 2003b; Johnson et al. 
2001). As a primarily tactical model, it compliments our model of power types, 
suggesting the specific mechanisms that the con artist may employ to realize 
specific power forms over the victim.  
For example, research suggests that con-artists pretending to be businesses 
prefer masking, and relabeling, thereby achieving expert and legitimate power 
(Grazioli and Jarvenpaa, 2003a). Specifically focused on the Internet, Grazioli 
and Jarvenpaa (2000) studied the effectiveness of dazzling, inventing, and 
relabeling for disguising fraudulent web sites, often used to achieve reward, 
expert and referent power.  
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Table 1. Available Tactics in the Theory of Deception  
(Grazioli and Jarvenpaa 2003b) 
Tactic Definition 
Masking Hiding or destroying critical information 
Dazzling Disguising critical information 
Decoying Distracting the victim’s attention away from critical 
information. 
Mimicking Assuming someone else’s identity, or impersonating someone 
else. 
Inventing Making up information. 
Relabeling Presenting information in a misleading way. 
Double play Suggesting to the victim that the victim is taking advantage of 
the deceiver. 
 
6. POWER AND DECEPTION ON THE INTERNET 
Along with the developments in the Internet, opportunities to commit fraud and 
unethical acts have become more available. The Internet has created 
opportunities to exert perceived power and negotiation skills that were unheard 
of 20 years ago. And as technology continues to advance, perpetrators find new 
means and ways to deceive individuals and commit fraud.   
Proposition 4: The Internet has become a significant, new instrument in 
the negotiation process between perpetrators and victims. 
According to U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics (2004), the 
majority of perpetrators of Internet fraud make contact with the victim through 
e-mail (63.5%) or a webpage (23.5%). Internet auction fraud was by far the 
most common (71.2%), but in terms of the size of the losses, check fraud 
($3,600), Nigerian letter fraud ($3,000), and confidence fraud ($1,000) were 
the largest.  
It has been suggested that fraud like other crime, can best be explained by three 
distinct factors: (1) a supply of motivated offenders, (2) the availability of 
suitable targets, and (3) the absence of capable guardians (Cohen and Felson, 
1979; Krambia-Kapardis, 2001).   
First, the Internet supplies a gathering place for an endless supply of offenders.  
The connectivity and global reach provided by the Internet means that these 
offenders can be anywhere in the world and through the Internet can 
communicate with anyone. Communication through email, the primary method 
of contacting victims, is instantaneous and practically free due to low 
transaction costs. The Internet also allows offenders the ability to easily 
customize their scams to individual users and the flexibility to quickly change 
the scam once it is discovered. In auctions alone, Chua and Wareham (2004) 
identified 11 different types of fraud, and state that “con artists know that 
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developing specialized fraud schemes increases their profits while minimizing 
their risk of capture” (p. 33).  
Second, the Internet supplies numerous suitable targets.  Victims can be 
approached through e-mail, chat rooms, pop-up adds, websites and numerous 
other media via the Internet. Web sites like eBay, with its 181 million 
registered users worldwide, provide offenders with easy access to a large 
number of potential victims. However, access to potential victims is not 
exclusive to the Internet. Perpetrators of fraud can obtain personal information 
in a number of ways, including: stealing wallets, purses or credit cards; stealing 
mail or through sending a fraudulent address change form; through viruses or 
spyware; or through unsolicited emails or telephone calls, and in over half the 
cases the offender has a prior relationship with the victim (Diller-Haas, 2004). 
Third, the Internet provides a perfect scenario for fraudulent activity with few 
or no capable guardians.  The Internet has no boundaries; it crosses 
communities, cultures, and countries. Much fraud crosses national and 
international legal jurisdictions, and, hence, perpetrators have little risk of 
getting caught or punished.  For example, while many states within the United 
States have statutes relating to cybercrime such as money laundering, identity 
theft, online gambling, and cyber stalking, there is no standard and the rules 
vary from state to state (Brenner, 2001).  Because most of these statutes were 
written before the Internet existed, the statutes only relate to property, 
computer, or other types of illegal acts and do not specifically address 
cybercrime. Fraud is a covert crime, making collection of evidence for 
prosecution difficult; it is nonviolent so it receives less evidence by society and 
lower priority by law enforcement; most Internet frauds are small and thus 
victims have little incentive to prosecute; and when offenders are caught they 
often receive light sentences (Chua and Wareham, 2004).  
Proposition 5: Fraud is becoming more widespread because the Internet 
supplies a gathering place for an endless supply of offenders, offers 
numerous suitable targets, and provides a scenario for fraudulent activity 
with few or no capable guardians.  
7.  A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL 
To understand the interaction between power, negotiation, and the Internet, the 
following model is presented.  On the left are French and Raven’s five types of 
power. The offender will use the five types of power to deceive the victim into 
the negotiation. The middle box represents deception, which is enhanced 
through technological advances, such as the Internet, electronic commerce, or 
any other technological media used for communication. The right hand box 
represents the victim, including the victim’s emotions that the perpetrator will 
try to manipulate and use in the deception process. The successful negotiation 
is the final outcome of the perpetrator using power to deceive, via the Internet, 
the victim by manipulating the victim’s emotions.  
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Figure 3. The Cybercrime Framework 
In all scams, there is some perceived reward that is never fully realized, or is 
misrepresented in some way, whether in the form of money, which never 
arrives, or goods or services, which are not provided or are somehow less than 
that which was promised.  The key to whether the negotiation is successful or 
not hinges on the perception on the part of the victim as to the size of the 
reward as well as the victim’s perception that the offender is legitimate. The 
perceived expert power has a positive relationship with perceived legitimate 
power. Furthermore, the perceived referent power is increased through 
repeated interactions between offender and victim, and also has a positive 
relationship with perceived legitimate power. Coercive power is generally used 
to create the impression that the offer is unique and for a limited time, and can 
create a sense of urgency in the negotiation.    
To illustrate this model, we present the top ten Internet scams of 2005 in Table 
2 (Internet Fraud Watch, 2005). In the table, we posit how each type of fraud 
appeals to a specific type of power, as well as the predominant deceit tactics 
employed to exercise each power. 
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Table 2. Internet Crime within the Cybercrime Framework 
Perpetrator Perceived 
Reward Power 
Perceived 
Coercive Power 
Perceived 
Expert Power 
Perceived 
Legitimate 
Power 
Perceived 
Referent 
Power 
Victim 
 
 
Desire for a 
Reward or 
Benefit 
Fear of 
Punishment 
Desire for a 
Need or Want 
Level of 
Obedience 
Relationship 
Needs 
Deception via the 
Internet 
• Dazzling 
• Decoying 
• Mimicking 
• Inventing 
• Relabeling 
• Mimicking 
• Inventing 
• Double 
play 
• Decoying 
• Dazzling 
• Mimicking 
• Relabeling 
 
• Decoying 
• Mimicking 
• Relabeling 
• Double 
play 
 
• Dazzling 
• Mimicking 
• Inventing 
• Double 
play 
 
Auctions Seller 
misrepresents 
product; 
Shilling/collusion 
artificially 
increases price 
Auction fever- 
buyers must act 
before auction 
close 
Seller may 
pose as expert 
in antiques or 
one-of-a-kind 
merchandise. 
Cut and paste 
from real 
experts 
Reputation 
scores – can 
be inflated by 
seller 
Seller poses as 
reputable 
company 
Trust 
relationship 
created 
through 
community 
forums 
General 
Merchandise 
Seller 
misrepresents 
product 
 Seller may 
pose as expert 
in antiques or 
one-of-a-kind 
merchandise. 
Cut and paste 
from real 
experts 
Seller poses as 
reputable 
company 
Seller creates 
trust through 
interactions 
with buyer 
Nigerian Money 
Offers 
Promise of large 
financial rewards 
Offer is 
confidential and 
for a limited 
time 
 Offender 
poses as high 
government 
official – 
gives evidence 
of legitimacy 
Appeals to 
needs of 
under- 
developed 
regions 
Fake Checks Victim perceives 
that checks are 
valid 
  Victim 
perceives that 
offender 
represents a 
legitimate 
company 
Offender 
creates trust 
relationship 
through 
interactions 
with victim 
Lotteries Promise of large 
financial rewards 
Offer is for a 
limited time 
 Offender 
poses as a 
reputable 
institution 
 
Phishing Victim expects 
validation of 
personal 
information 
Offender argues 
that user data 
has been stolen 
hence possible 
injury – updates 
required 
 Offender 
poses as a 
reputable 
institution 
known to the 
victim  
 
Advance Fee 
Loans 
Victim is 
promised loan in 
spite of his/her 
bad credit 
  Offender 
poses as a 
reputable 
institution 
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Table 2 (continued). Internet Crime within the Cybercrime Framework 
Information/Adult 
Services 
Victim receives 
expected services 
but with hidden 
conditions 
  Offender 
poses as a 
legitimate 
institution 
 
Work-at-Home Promise of large 
financial rewards 
 Offender 
poses as 
expert in 
home 
businesses 
Offender 
poses as a 
reputable 
institution 
 
Internet Access 
Services 
Cost of services 
misrepresented 
or services not 
provided 
  Offender 
poses as a 
reputable 
institution 
 
 
Perceived reward in auctions can be manipulated through various means. The 
seller can engage in shilling or bid shielding, where the price of the goods is 
artificially driven up through some behavior on the part of the seller. This 
creates the impression that the goods are more in demand than they actually 
are, resulting in higher bids from “legitimate” buyers.  The goods can also be 
misrepresented, where the seller describes an item incorrectly and thus the 
actual reward is less than what is perceived. Auctions also have a coercive 
nature, where the buyers feel that they must act immediately or lose a unique 
opportunity.  
Perceived expert power can be exercised in auctions, for example, in the case 
of goods which are supposedly antiques or one-of-a-kind, and the seller poses 
as a knowledgeable collector.  
Perceived legitimate power can be created through the reputation scores which 
are maintained on auction sites based on the number of situations where the 
buyer is satisfied or dissatisfied. These scores can be manipulated through 
“phantom” trades where the seller poses as a buyer on various trades and gives 
him or herself positive ratings, thus artificially elevating his or her reputation 
score.  
Finally, perceived referent power can be obtained through reputation scores as 
well as other community forums on the auction sites, where buyers and sellers 
can interact and perpetrators can gain the confidence of their potential victims.  
For each power form, we explore how the Internet enables specific tactics such 
as mimicking, inventing, and relabeling. The increased anonymity, global 
reach and low barriers to entry of the Internet enable fraudulent activity from 
all parts of the world. 
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8. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF ON-LINE 
FRAUD 
The model that has been presented may prove to be of great value to 
practitioners, regulators, and academics.  Even more importantly, this model 
may be of great help in protecting the common individual or consumer from 
being defrauded online.  As discussed earlier, perpetrators of fraud typically 
prey upon the susceptible – the elderly, immigrants, uneducated, or those who 
find themselves in a desperate situation.   
While the model successfully describes current well-known fraud types, it can 
also be used to generate generalized predicative statements concerning future 
fraud forms. For example, all of the perpetrator and victim characteristics have 
a positive relationship to the possible occurrence of fraud. However, there are a 
number of power types and deception methods that are particularly salient to 
Internet fraud. While any discussion of future fraud forms is clearly 
speculative, it is worth noting that most fraud forms have existed for many 
years. The majority of frauds occurring online today have their origins long 
before the development of the Internet (Albrecht et al. 2006). Even phishing is 
a variant of identity theft that has been practiced for years; the Internet simply 
permits a far more efficient execution. Accordingly, table 3 outlines a number 
of generalized fraud types, their victim and perpetrator characteristics, primary 
deception mechanisms as well as their alignment towards successful execution 
on the Internet. While this analysis is a simplification, our assumption is that 
future online frauds will likely be novel variants of traditional forms. As such, 
we highlight fraud forms that have a high proclivity with the Internet, and 
thereby have a higher likelihood of occurring in future forms. 
Opportunities for easy money or rewards will likely continue to occur in a 
variety of forms on the Internet. The Internet permits a number of techniques 
for manipulating or falsifying information to entice victims to send money in 
the hopes of future gain. Moreover, the vast reach of the Internet allows 
perpetrators to broadcast their lures to a broad audience, and efficiently identify 
and communicate with victims with a propensity to fall for the temptation of 
easy money. 
Likewise, the relative ease with which digital technology can replicate and 
manipulate non-existent, stolen or counterfeit products suggests that criminals 
will continue to employ these techniques in a variety of ways. In a similar vein, 
digital technology and the Internet enable institutional or expert legitimacy to 
be easily replicated, thereby permitting criminals to emulate legitimate 
scientific, legal or business institutions in a process of selling bogus 
pharmaceuticals, or medical, psychiatric, legal or business services. 
However, frauds that leverage personal relationships to a high degree will be 
less likely. In this situation, we can think of “the power of personal persuasion” 
where perpetrators leverage personal or professional relationships to coerce 
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victims. While we do not eliminate the possibility, the use of rich 
communication media and other social cues to manipulate victims makes these 
types of fraud less likely to occur exclusively via the Internet. Rather, the 
possibility for hybrid frauds, where the Internet is used for initial contact, and 
further negotiation occurs in person, is certainly feasible.    
  
         Table 3. Generalized Fraud Types, Their Victim and Perpetrator 
Characteristics, Primary Deception Mechanisms as Well as Their Alignment 
towards Successful Execution on the Internet 
 
Fraud Perpetrator 
Power 
Victim Deception 
via Internet 
Proclivity with Internet 
Offer for easy 
money or rewards 
Check or money 
transfer scams 
Perceived 
reward power 
Perceived expert 
power 
Perceived 
legitimate power 
Perceived 
coercive power 
Desire for 
rewards or 
benefit 
Lack of 
knowledge 
Level of 
obedience 
Fear of 
punishment 
Dazzling 
Inventing 
Relabeling 
Mimicking 
Decoying 
Medium-High 
The Internet is well aligned 
towards intimate 
communication with victim 
and manipulation/decoying 
of relevant information. 
This makes useful for 
frauds where the victim is 
coerced to send money in 
the hopes of obtaining 
future rewards. 
Merchandise at 
“too good to be 
true prices” 
Counterfeits, stolen 
products 
Perceived 
reward power 
Perceived expert 
power 
 
Desire for 
rewards or 
benefit 
Lack of 
knowledge 
 
Dazzling 
Mimicking 
Inventing 
Very High 
The relative ease with 
which information and 
images can be obtained, 
modified and reproduced is 
very high, making the 
Internet an excellent 
medium for this type of 
fraud. 
Fake or illegal 
pharmaceuticals or 
other medical, legal 
or professional 
services 
Perceived expert 
power 
Lack of 
knowledge 
Level of 
Obedience 
Mimicking 
Inventing 
Relabeling 
Very High 
Institutional or expert 
legitimacy can be easily 
replicated on the Internet  
Personal cons 
Fake loans or 
financial 
transactions 
Fake business 
ventures  
Perceived 
coercive power 
Perceived 
referent power 
Perceived 
legitimate power 
Fear of 
punishment 
Level of 
obedience 
Relationship 
needs 
Masking 
Inventing  
Double play 
Low 
These “personal” frauds are 
highly dependent on the  
perpetrator’s ability to 
leverage personal or 
professional power over 
victim.  
Stealing 
confidential 
information, 
phishing, identity 
theft 
Perceived 
legitimate power 
Perceived 
referent power 
Fear of 
punishment 
Level of 
obedience 
Mimicking 
Relabeling 
Very High 
Institutional or expert 
legitimacy is easily 
reproduced on the Internet 
 
Finally, techniques for collecting confidential information on victims will 
likely continue in tact with the technology that ensures its prevention. 
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Computer security experts have long acknowledged that the weakest security 
holes in any socio-technical system are not technical, but human. As previously 
argued, digital technology enables the relatively easy replication of 
institutional legitimacy, thereby enticing obedient victims to divulge 
confidential information. 
In conclusion, any discussion of future fraud forms on the Internet should 
highlight the salient features of the technology that provide a catalyst for fraud. 
The Internet has a very broad reach, and perpetrators can efficiently 
communicate with a broad group of potential victims and trigger responses that 
identify them as susceptible to fraud (e.g. victim characteristics). Secondly, 
digital technology permits perpetrators to easily replicate legitimate products, 
or services that are in fact, non-existent or counterfeit. This is further enabled 
by a similar use of technology to emulate well-know businesses or institutions 
to support claims of legitimacy in a variety of fraud forms, be they financial, 
counterfeit, or phishing/identity theft frauds.   
9. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Our model identifies five types of power, the primary tactics utilized to realize 
the power, and the common fraud types where these elements are manifest. The 
next step in this research is rigorous empirical validation with both aggregate 
data analysis as well as controlled experimentation. Understanding the ways in 
which perpetrators of fraud are able to exert these five types of power across 
the Internet is a first step towards helping regulators, companies and 
individuals develop better strategies for its control and prevention.  
The strength of this model lies in the fact that it explains the relationship that 
takes place between perpetrator and victim, specifically in an online 
environment.  Moreover, understanding the techniques employed, and how 
potential fraud victims self-select themselves in response to these mechanisms 
will enable policy makers and consumers to understand the overall process of 
online deception and decrease the overall risk of current and future frauds.   
Education is the key to preventing fraud.  If the model proves accurate with 
further testing, consumer protection agencies will have a valuable tool to assist 
them in the deterrence of fraud.  Furthermore, consumers will be able to 
identify potential perpetrators who would try to exploit them using the five 
types of power discussed.  If consumers can become more aware of their 
susceptibility to these types of frauds, they will become more aware of 
potential situations where they are susceptible to fraud. In other words, the 
model may help identify areas where the probability of on-line fraud occurring 
is higher. 
The purpose of this paper has been to advance theoretical understanding of the 
specific power forms that perpetrators use when influencing victims in 
fraudulent transactions. The model has combined the dimensions of power and 
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negotiation from the management and psychological literature as well as 
Internet fraud research from the Information Systems field.  We have examined 
the moderating effects of the Internet on the communication and fraud process 
between perpetrator and victim, as well as deception tactics employed to 
realize each power type in frequently occurring fraud forms. 
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